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Introduction 
Any  public  policy  is  only  as  good  as  its  implementation. 
Regardless  of  the  quality  of  its  conception,  if  its  delivery  is 
not  consistent  with  its  conception,  the  rhetoric  of  a program  can 
diverge  widely  from  its  reality.  Policy  evaluation  typically 
takes  place  ex  ante.  Incentives  are  evaluated  and  the  outcome  of 
the  program  is predicted  based  on  assumptions  about  the  logic  of 
the  program  and  the  coverage  of  targeted  groups.  In  contrast, 
this  study  presents  an  ex post  evaluation  of  a public  housing 
assistance  program:  the  Farmer's  Home  Administration  Section  502 
Low  Income  Home  Ownership  program.  Specifically,  this  study 
examines  two  aspects  of  the  program:  (1) the  implementation  of 
the  program,  and  (2) the  effect(s)  of  program  implementation  on 
the  achievement  of  program  goals. 
The  Farmer's  Home  Administration  of  the  USDA  administers  a 
number  of  housing  loan  and  grant  programs.  One  of  these  is  the 
Section  502  Low-Income  Rural  Home  Ownership  Program.  The  program 
is  designed  to  assist  low-income  rural  households  to  obtain  loans 
to  purchase,  rehabilitate,  or  relocate  modest  housing.  The 
program  is  administered  through  USDA  county  offices  in  more  than 
1900  sites  throughout  the  country. 
The  intention  of  the  Section  502  program  is  to  subsidize 
housing  costs  in  the  early  years  of  a mortgage  with  the  hope  that 
borrowers  gain  self-sufficiency  in  later  years.  An  interest 
subsidy  is provided  to  qualifying  borrowers  on  the  basis  of  their annual  household  income.  The  subsidy  is  adjusted  from  year  to 
year  according  to  changes  in  household  income.  The  effective 
payment  on  a  Section  502  loan  is  set  so  that  borrowers  spend  20 
percent  of  their  income  on  mortgage  principal  and  interest 
payments,  property  taxes  and  home  owner's  insurance. 
While  this  simple  description  of  the  Section  502  program 
might  give  the  appearance  that  the  program  is  easy  to  administer, 
in  fact  it  is  not.  Complicated  guidelines  are  followed  to 
recalculate  mortgage  payments  on  a yearly  basis.  To  make 
matters  worse,  the  Section  502  program  is  administered  by 
Farmer's  Home  officers  at  the  county  level,  who  are  responsible 
also  for  a number  of  other  programs  and  thus  may  not  have  an  in- 
depth  familiarity  with  the  technical  aspects  of  residential 
mortgage  finance. 
Due  to  its  complexity,  a comprehensive  evaluation  of  the 
Section  502  program  is problematic.  There  are  a number  of  broad 
dimensions  across  which  the  program  can  be  evaluated.  Does  the 
program  live  up  to  its  stated  goals  of  promoting  low  income  home 
ownership  and  self  sufficiency?  Does  program  implementation 
create  unanticipated  problems?  Is program  implementation 
consistent  with  the  stated  goals  of  the  program? 
More  narrowly,  this  study  examines  the  effect  of  program 
implementation  on  the  promotion  of  "'correct"  behavior  among 
Section  502  participants.  Specifically,  this  study  examines  the 
quality  of  program  implementation  and  how  it  relates  to  mortgage 
performance,  whether  program  implementation  helps  explain  loan 4 
performance  for  those  who  defaulted  or  those  who  succeeded  in 
working  their  way  toward  self-sufficiency. 
A  Note  on  Previous  Research  on  Program  Evaluation 
Typically,  program  evaluations  have  one  of  three  objectives. 
First,  evaluations  can  assess  the  conceptualization  and  design  of 
interventions.  Second,  evaluations  can  be  used  to  monitor 
program  implementation.  Finally,  evaluations  can  be  used  to 
assess  program  utility  or  impact.  Although  evaluations  address 
all  these  objectives  to  some  degree,  evaluations  can  be  grouped 
into  three  types  on  the  basis  of  the  main  objective  that  guides 
them. 
The  examination  of  housing  and  community  development 
programs  ordered  by  President  Nixon  in  1973  is  an  example  of  the 
first  type  of  evaluation.  The  programs  evaluated  included  the 
low  rent  public  housing,  the  Section  502  interest  credit  and 
noninterest  credit  rural  homeownership,  the  Section  504  rural 
home  repair  assistance,  the  Section  235  homeownership,  the 
Section  236  rental  assistance,  and  the  rent  supplement 
programsl. 
Many  of  these  programs  began  during  the  1960s  as  part  of  the 
Great  Society  initiatives  of  President  Johnson.  President  Nixon 
used  this  evaluation  to  reconceptualize  the  nature  of  government 
intervention  in  housing  and  community  development  issues.  As  a 
1 USHUD  (1974). 5 
result,  President  Nixon  replaced  many  of  the  categorical  programs 
evaluated  with  a block  grant  program,  the  Community  Development 
Block  Grant  (CDBG)  program. 
Another  example  of  an  evaluation  that  assessed  the 
conceptualization  and  design  of  programs  was  done  by  Stegman, 
Quercia,  McCarthy  and  Rohe  (1991).  A  simulation  model  was 
constructed  using  the  Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics  (PSID).  The 
model  was  used  to  evaluate  the  affordability  characteristics  of  a 
variety  of  low  income  homeownership  programs  and  mortgage 
instruments.  The  simulation  "placed"  low  income  renters  in  the 
various  programs  and  used  the  longitudinal  data  to  evaluate  how 
they  would  have  performed  if  they  had  participated.' 
The  Public  Housing  Home  Ownership  Demonstration  study  (PHHD) 
is  an  example  of  the  evaluation  of  program  implementation.  The 
PHHD  was  evaluated  during  its  demonstration  phase.  As  part  of 
the  PHHD,  a number  of  public  housing  and  Indian  authorities  were 
authorized  to  transfer  to  income-eligible  tenants  the  units  they 
were  occupying.  USHUD  left  it up  to  the  public  housing 
authorities  to  select  the  public  housing  units  that  were  most 
appropriate  for  sale  to  tenants  and  to  set  the  prices  and  terms 
of  unit  sale.  The  goal  of  the  evaluation  was  to  assess  the 
' The  model  was  used  to  evaluate  the  Section  235  program, 
the  National  Housing  Trust  (NHT)  and  the  Homeownership  and 
Opportunity  for  People  Everywhere  (HOPE)  initiatives  contained  in 
the  National  Affordable  Housing  Act  (NAHA)  of  1990,  and  four 
mortgage  instruments:  the  standard  fixed  rate  mortgage,  the 
adjustable  rate  mortgage  (ARM),  the  price  level  adjusted-mortgage 
(PLAM),  and  the  dual  indexed  mortgage  (DIM). 6 
effectiveness,  efficiency  and  unexpected  impacts  of  a variety  of 
limited  scale,  operating  programs.  This  was  done  to  determine 
the  essential  characteristics  of  successful  low  income 
homeownership  programs  utilizing  the  existing  public  housing 
stock.3  Many  of  the  study  findings  were  later  incorporated  in 
the  design  of  the  Homeownership  and  Opportunity  for  People 
Everywhere  program  (HOPE). 
Finally,  the  study  of  the  FHA  Section  203(b)  single  family 
mortgage  insurance  program,  done  by  USHUD  in  1984,  represents  an 
example  of  the  third  type  of  evaluation,  which  assesses  program 
utility  and  impacts.  The  goal  of  this  study  was  to  assess 
whether  those  served  by  the  FHA  Section  203(b)  program  were 
distinct  from  those  served  by  the  private  mortgage  insurance 
industry.  This  was  an  important  goal  given  that  the  FHA  Section 
203(b)  was  established  in  1934  when  private  mortgage  insurance 
was  not  available  and  thus  the  impact  and  utility  of  the  FHA 
program  needed  to  be  reassessed. 
Of  particular  importance  to  the  present  study  is  the 
evaluation  of  the  Section  502  program  done  by  the  Housing 
Assistance  Council  (HAC  1988),  which  is  another  example  of  the 
third  type  of  evaluation.  HAC  examined  the  impact  of  the  program 
on  the  targeted  population  to  determine  whether  housing 
assistance  for  the  poor  through  subsidized  homeownership  was  cost 
effective  relative  to  rental  subsidy.  HAC  evaluated  the  program 
3 Stegman  and  Rohe  (1990) descriptively,  using  mean  and  median  measures  and  personal 
interviews  to  capture  a portrait  of  the  program. 
In  contrast  to  HAC's  evaluation  of  the  Section  502  program, 
the  present  study  exhibits  two  distinct  characteristics.  First, 
because  HAC's  study  is based  on  descriptive  analyses,  it  is  not 
possible  to  assess  the  real  impact  of  program  characteristics  on 
program  participants,  unless  they  are 
specified  multivariate  model.  A  mult 
this  study. 
evaluated  within  a  fully 
ivariate  analysis  is  used  in 
Second,  in  contrast  to  HAC's  evaluation,  this  study  only 
examines  one  aspect  within  the  overall  implementation  of  the  FmHA 
Section  502  Home  Ownership  program:  its  delivery  system.  The 
Section  502  program  offers  an  interest  credit  subsidy  to  make  the 
purchase  of  homes  more  affordable  to  low  and  moderate  income 
rural  households.  The  study  assess  the  effect  of  improper 
interest  credit  and  mortgage  underwriting  calculations  on  the 
short-run  mortgage  repayment  behavior  of  Section  502 
participants.4  Specifically,  the  study  examines  whether 
mortgage  default  or  "graduation""  from  the  program  are  related 
to  program  delivery. 
4 Program  regulations  state  that  any  interest  credit  or 
other  subsidy  assistance  granted  improperly  either  as  a  result  of 
false  information  or  through  error  will  be  repaid  by  the 
borrower.  Thus,  the  short  run  examination  presented  in  this 
study  should  not  be  taken  as  a critique  of  the  government 
officials  responsible  for  implementing  the  FmHA  Section  502 
program  who,  in  accordance  with  the  legislative  mandate,  are 
expected  to  review  and  correct  errors  in  the  long  run. 
5 HAC  (1988) 8 
The  conceptual  foundations  used  to  examine  mortgage  payment 
performance  among  Section  502  participants  is based  on  postulates 
derived  from  the  mortgage  default  literature.  The  following 
section  reviews  the  theory  of  mortgage  default  used  to  develop 
the  multivariate  models  tested. 
Mortgage  Default 
Most  contemporary  studies  of  mortgage  default  are  couched 
in  option  theory.6  This  theory  states  that  at  the  beginning  of 
each  payment  period,  borrowers  have  the  option  of  making  the 
payment  due,  of  selling  their  house  and  paying  off  the  mortgage 
balance  (prepayment),  or  of  exercising  the  option  to  give  the 
house  to  the  lender  in  exchange  for  extinguishing  the  first 
mortgage  lien  and  canceling  the  associated  debt  (default).  In 
assessing  whether  or  not  to  exercise  the  default  option,  a  so 
called  put  option,  borrowers  consider  the  market  value  of  the 
mortgage  and  the  equity  they  have  in  the  home,  which  is  a crude 
measure  of  the  extent  to  which  the  put  option  is  "in  the  money"7 
From  this  perspective,  default  is  seen  as  a purely  financial 
matter,  in  which  borrower  characteristics  such  as  income  and 
6For  a  review  of  the  literature  on  residential  mortgage 
default  see  Quercia  and  Stegman  (1992).  This  section  is  based  on 
PP.  17-20  of  Quercia  and  Stegman's  review. 
'  Quigley  and  Van  Order  (1991) employment  status  do  not  matter.* 
Ideally,  borrowers  will  exercise  the  default  option 
whenever  the  value  of  the  house  plus  any  costs  of  exercising  the 
option  falls  below  the  mortgage  value.9  However,  because  the 
default  option  has  intrinsic  value  and  the  current  value  of  the 
mortgage  is  affected  by  the  option  to  default  in  the  future,  some 
borrowers  with  negative  equity  may  not  default  because  they  would 
forfeit  the  option  of  defaulting  later.]"  This  factor  makes  it 
difficult  to  compute  the  value  of  the  option. 
A  second  issue  that  makes  this  computation  complex  is  the 
problem  of  estimating  the  costs  of  exercising  the  default  option. 
Borrowers  are  assumed  to  consider  costs  such  as  transaction 
costs,  moving  costs,  and  the  value  of  the  borrower's  reputation 
and  credit  rating,  which  are  also  affected  by  default.ll 
Moreover,  a number  of  other  borrower  related  factors  have  been 
found  to  have  a  significant  effect  on  default  (Vandell  and 
Thibodeau  1985).  The  importance  of  these  factors,  however,  is 
not  consistent  with  the  purely  financial  view  of  the  default 
option, 
The  role  of  transaction  costs  and  borrower  related-factors 
in  the  default  decision  remains  open  to  debate.  Kau,  Keenan,  and 
A  For  a discussion  of  options  in  the  financial 
literature  see  Simons  (1990)  pp.  82-86. 
' Foster  and  Van  Order  (1984) 
"  Epperson,  et  al.  (1985) 
l1  Quigley  and  Van  Order  (1991). 10 
Kim  (1991)  have  solved  numerically  an  option-based  theoretical 
model  of  default  that  indicates  that  transaction  costs  play 
little  or  no  role  in  the  exercise  of  the  option;  therefore,  they 
conclude  that  the  option  is  exercised  ruthlessly.  Quigley  and 
Van  Order  (1992),  however,  have  identified  a number  of 
inconsistencies  between  the  theoretical  premises  of  the  ruthless 
model  and  observed  default  behavior.  Quigley  and  Van  Order 
suggest  that  reputation  costs  (one  form  of  transaction  cost), 
along  with  a  random  term  of  the  mortgage,  can  explain  observed 
default  behavior  (for  instance,  among  borrowers  with  nonassumable 
mortgages  who  want  or  have  to  move).  Quigley  and  Van  Order  did 
not  test  this  premise  empirically. 
A  major  reason  for  this  ongoing  debate  has  been  a  lack  of 
adequate  panel  data  containing  relevant  borrower-related 
information.  Typically,  borrower  information  at  the  time  of 
default  has  been  estimated  from  borrower  information  that  was 
collected  at  the  time  of  loan  origination  through  the  use  of 
proxy  measures  and  multivariate  statistical  techniques. 
Unfortunately,  these  estimated  measures  may  not  reflect  the 
specific  circumstances  of  individual  borrowers  who  default,  thus 
resulting  in  conflicting  or  insignificant  findings.  Panel  data 
is  required  to  analyze  the  role  of  contemporaneous 
borrower-related  factors,  as  well  as  property  and  loan 
characteristics,  on  default. 
Although  the  debate  continues  due  to  lack  of  panel  data  on  a 
sample  of  unsubsidized  borrowers,  a recent  study  by  Quercia, 11 
McCarthy,  and  Stegman  (1993)  examined  the  default  behavior  of  a 
sample  of  Section  502  participants  using  panel  data.  The  authors 
found  that  contemporaneous  measures  of  equity,  including  monetary 
transaction  costs,  had  little  influence  on  the  probability  of 
default.  Financial  stress  and  demographic  factors,  however, 
showed  strong  statistical  effects  on  the  probability  of  default. 
Thus,  they  found  no  support  for  the  purely  financial  view  of  the 
default  option.  Obviously,  the  generalizability  of  these 
findings  may  be  limited  because  of  the  subsidized  nature  of  the 
sample.  As  other  panel  data  become  available,  the  significance 
of  transaction  costs  and  borrower  related  factors  on  the  default 
decision  of  unsubsidized  borrowers  may  be  clarified. 
The  panel  data  used  by  Quercia,  McCarthy  and  Stegman  (1993) 
was  collected  by  the  Housing  Assistance  Council  for  their 
evaluation  of  the  Section  502  program.  The  same  panel  data  is 
used  in  the  present  study. 
The  Section  502  Low  Income  Home  Ownership  Program 
The  Farmer's  Home  Administration  (FmHA)  Section  502  Home 
Ownership  program  provides  direct  loans  to  qualified  households 
for  the  purchase  of  new  or  existing  single  family  h0mes.l'  FmHA 
Section  502  loans  can  also  be  used  to  build,  rehabilitate, 
improve  or  relocate  a dwelling  or  provide  related  facilities. 
The  terms  of  the  loan  are  for  33  years,  or  38  years  for  borrowers 
12  The  information  presented  in  this  section  draws  from  HAC 
(1987)  and  Quercia,  McCarthy,  and  Stegman  (1993). 12 
with  incomes  at  or  below  60 percent  of  area  median  income  (MI) 
and  who  need  the  extra  term  to  show  payment  ability,  or  30  years 
for  loans  made  for  the  purchase  of  manufactured  homes. 
The  loans  have  an  interest  rate  (note  rate)  approximately 
equal  to  the  federal  costs  of  long-term  borrowing.  Although  the 
loans  have  a  fixed  note  rate,  the  actual  rates  paid  by  borrowers 
depend  upon  their  annual  income.  The  difference  between  the  note 
rate  and  the  interest  rate  actually  paid  by  borrowers  is  called 
the  interest  credit.  This  is  the  subsidy  provided  by  the 
program. 
The  effective  rate  on  a  Section  502  loan  is  set  so  that 
borrowers  spend  20  percent  of  their  adjusted  income  on  mortgage 
principal  and  interest  payments,  property  taxes,  and  homeowner's 
insurance.  Adjusted  income  is  estimated  by  subtracting  a number 
of  authorized  deductions  from  a borrower's  annual  income.  These 
adjustments  include  deductions  for  each  family  member  under  18 
years  of  age,  elderly,  disabled  or  full  time  student  residing  in 
the  household  (other  than  applicant,  spouse  or  co-applicant). 
Some  medical  expenses,  and  a number  of  other  family  related 
deductions  are  also  authorized.  It  is  the  borrower's  adjusted 
income  that  is  used  in  the  computation  of  the  interest  credit. 
The  maximum  interest  credit  can  reduce  the  effective 
interest  rate  paid  by  borrowers  to  1 percent.  Borrowers  who 
initially  qualify  for  this  maximum  interest  credit  subsidy  must 
absorb  out-of-pocket  all  future  increases  in property  taxes  and 
home  owners'  insurance.  Higher  income  borrowers  who  qualify  for 13 
a  smaller  interest  credit  at  the  time  of  loan  origination,  can 
have  their  subsidy  increase  with  increases  in  taxes  and  insurance 
over  time,  until  they,  too,  qualify  for  the  maximum. 
The  interest  credit  is  calculated  as  the  lesser  of  either 
(1) the  difference  between  (a) the  total  annual  payment  of 
mortgage  principal  and  interest  at  note  rate,  insurance,  and 
property  taxes  and  (b) 20  percent  of  annual  adjusted  income;  or 
(2) the  difference  between  (a) the  annual  payment  for  principal 
and  interest  at  note  rate,  and  (b) the  payment  of  principal  and 
interest  at  a  1 percent  interest  rate.  Every  year,  the  interest 
credit  is  revised  based  on  changes  in  household  income. 
Borrowers  must  have  incomes  at  or  below  80  percent  of  area 
median  income  (AMI)  to  receive  an  interest  credit  at  the  time  of 
loan  origination.  Borrowers  continue  to  receive  an  interest 
credit  as  long  as  they  have  low  incomes.  As  income  rises,  the 
interest  credit  is  reduced.  The  phasing  out  is  gradual,  up  to 
the  point  where  household  income  reaches  a certain  threshold,  set 
by  FmHA,  on  average,  at  $5,500  above  80  percent  of  AMI.  At  this 
point,  the  borrower  loses  the  interest  credit  and  must  thereafter 
pay  the  full  rate  at  which  the  mortgage  was  originally  written. 
Once  the  interest  credit  is  lost,  only  those  borrowers  whose 
incomes  fall  below  80  percent  of AM1  again  become  eligible  to 
receive  the  interest  credit. 
Moderate  income  borrowers,  those  with  incomes  above  80 
percent  of  AM1  at  origination,  can  also  qualify  for  Section  502 
loans,  but  they  do  not  receive  any  interest  credits.  For  these 14 
borrowers,  the  interest  rate  remains  fixed  for  the  life  of  the 
mortgage.  The  interest  rate  subsidy,  or  interest  credit,  is  a 
key  component  of  the  FmHA  Section  502  program.  It  acts  as  a 
buffer  when  borrowers  experience  unexpected  declines  in  income, 
thus  minimizing  risk  of  loan  termination  due  to  mortgage 
non-payment. 
In broad  terms,  termination  of  a  Section  502  loan  can  occur 
in  three  ways:  (1) when  the  mortgage  is  refinanced;  (2) when  the 
unit  is  sold  by  the  borrower  and  the  loan  is prepaid;  and,  (3) 
when,  in  the  eventuality  of  mortgage  non-payment,  title  to  the 
property  is  transferred  to  the  lender  in  exchange  for 
extinguishing  the  mortgage  debt.  The  transfer  of  title  to  the 
lender  can  occur  in  three  ways:  (a) through  foreclosure;  (b) 
through  transfer  of  the  deed  in  lieu  of  foreclosure;  and  (c) 
through  voluntary  conveyance.  In  all  three  cases,  borrowers 
forego  their  claim  to  any  equity  in  the  property  in  exchange  for 
cancellation  of  the  outstanding  debt. 
The  FmHA  Section  502  program  has  a built-in  recapture 
provision.  When  dwellings  are  sold  or  loans  transferred,  any 
unpaid  principal  and  interest  due  at  note  rate  are  disbursed  to 
FmHA.  At  this  time,  borrowers  also  receive  an  amount  equal  to 
their  original  equity.  The  remaining  balance,  if  any,  is  called 
value  appreciation.  A  share  of  this  value  appreciation  is 
received  by  FmHA  as  repayment  for  the  subsidy  granted.  FmHA's 
share  varies  by  length  of  residence  and  the  average  effective 
interest  rate  paid  by  borrowers  over  the  holding  period.  The 15 
recapture  estimation  is  structured  so  that  borrowers  receive  the 
largest  share  of  any  value  appreciation. 
There  is  an  important  variation  to  the  basic  Section  502 
program.  Groups  of  families  that  are  unable  to  build  or  acquire 
adequate  homes  due  to  their  low  incomes  can  participate  in  mutual 
self  help  housing  projects,  which  are  sponsored  usually  by 
nonprofit  organizations.  Typically,  6 to  12  eligible  families 
help  each  other  build  their  homes  under  qualified  supervision. 
The  resulting  reduction  in  labor  costs  allows  otherwise 
ineligible  families  to  own  their  homes.  Loans  are  made  available 
to  each  participating  family.  If  families  cannot  meet  their 
mortgage  obligations  during  the  construction  period,  unmet 
payments  can  be  added  to  the  principal  outstanding  balance  of  the 
loan. 
FmHA  Section  502  housing  loans  are  available  only  to  rural 
households.  Loans  are  available  to  households  living  in  (1) open 
country,  and  (2) small  towns,  even  if  adjacent  to  densely  settled 
areas.  Small  towns  are  considered  eligible  if  they  have  less 
than  10.000  people  and  are  rural  in  character.  If mortgage 
credit  is  unavailable,  towns  with  populations  between  10.000  and 
20,000,  that  are  not  contained  in  a metropolitan  area,  are  also 
eligible. 
Research  Methodology 
The  research  methodology  used  to  analyze  the  mortgage 
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borrowers  is  presented  in  this  section.  Three  issues  are 
discussed  in  some  detail:  (1) a description  of  the  Section  502 
panel  data,  (2) a description  of  the  measures  included  in  the 
analysis,  and  (3) a description  of  the  proportional  hazard 
estimation  used  in  the  multivariate  analysis. 
1.  The  panel  data 
The  Section  502  panel  data  used  in  the  analysis  was 
collected  by  the  Housing  Assistance  Council  (HAC),  a well-known 
non-profit,  rural  advocacy,  technical  assistance,  and  development 
organization,  based  in Washington,  D.C.  The  panel  data  is  for  a 
cross  section  of  894  Section  502  borrowers  who  received  loans  in 
1981-84.  HAC  followed  the  progress  of  these  borrowers  from  the 
time  of  loan  origination  to  1986,  collecting  a wide  range  of 
contemporaneous  data  on  families,  loans,  and  properties 
throughout  the  period.  The  sample  was  selected  in  three  steps: 
(1) counties  were  selected  to  be  representative  of  counties 
nationwide  based  on  a matrix  of  census  region,  and  the 
metropolitan  status,  racial  composition  and  incidence  of  poverty 
in  each  county;  (2) FmHA  Offices  with  a maximum  of  1981  loan 
activity  in  counties  in  each  of  the  matrix  groupings  were 
selected  for  sampling;  and,  (3) all  the  usable  loan  records  in 
each  of  these  offices  were  included  in  the  sample. 
The  clustering  used  in  the  survey  weighted  the  sample  in 
favor  of  areas  where  FmHA  was  both  active  in  home  loans,  i.e., 
had  the  largest  caseloads,  and  serving  very  low-income 
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does  not  limit  the  overall  representativeness  of  the  sample 
because  offices  with  the  largest  caseloads  represented  the  bulk 
of  Section  502  activity.  Evidence  of  this  representativeness  can 
be  derived  from  comparing  the  sample's  average  income  and  subsidy 
trends  with  those  of  all  FmHA  borrowers.  The  average  adjusted 
income  of  sample  borrowers  was  $9,333  compared  with  FmHA's  1981 
nationwide  average  of  $9,485.  Similarly,  subsidy  trends  among 
sample  borrowers  reflected  those  of  all  FmHA  borrowers.13 
2. Variables  and  measures 
The  data  set  contained  or  allowed  for  the  generation  of  all 
the  variables  necessary  in  the  analysis.  A  summary  of  the 
variables  and  measures  included  in the  analysis  is  presented  in 
Appendix  1.  Estimation  was  done  using  two  different  durations  as 
dependent  variables.  First,  the  hazard  of  mortgage  default  was 
estimated  using  the  duration  of  the  mortgage  until  default 
occurred  as  the  dependent  variable.  A  dichotomous  variable  was 
designed  to  capture  the  occurrence  of  default,  i.e.,  the  transfer 
of  the  property  title  to  the  lender  in  exchange  for  the 
cancellation  of  the  outstanding  debt.  Households  defaulted  on 
their  loans  if  one  of  the  following  occurred:  foreclosure, 
transfer  of  deed,  or  voluntary  conveyance.  Second,  a model  was 
estimated  using  the  duration  until  the  zero-subsidy  state  was 
reached  as  the  dependent  variable. 
I3  HAC  (1988)  p.  32. 18 
A  number  of  independent  variables, 
pr ior  work,  were  included  in  the  analys 
suggested  by  theory  and 
is.  First,  consistent 
with  the  bulk  of  the  default  literature,  a measure  of  annual  loan 
balance  to  house  value  ratio  (LVRATIO)  was  constructed  to  capture 
the  equity  position  of  borrowers  during  each  year  of  the  study 
period.  The  data  set  contained  annual  loan  balance  information. 
In  contrast,  the  data  set  only  contained  purchase  price 
information  at  time  of  origination.  House  value  information  for 
each  year  of  the  study  period  was  estimated  by  adjusting  the 
appraised  value  of  the  home  at  the  time  of  origination  to  reflect 
changes  in  the  regional  consumer  price  index  for  each  year-l4 
Second,  a measure  of  a borrower's  ability  to  pay  was 
included  in  the  analysis.  This  measure  was  constructed  as  the 
ratio  of  housing  costs  to  adjusted  household  income  (PTIRATIO). 
The  housing  costs  included  in  the  construction  of  this  ratio  were 
mortgage  principal  and  interest  payments,  and  annual  property 
taxes  and  home  owners  insurance  payments  (PITI).  Adjusted  income 
(ADJINC)  was  determined  by  FmHA  based  on  family  composition. 
Third,  information  on  the  subsidy  received  over  the  course 
of  the  mortgage  was  also  included  in  the  analysis.  The  amount  of 
subsidy  received  was  included  in the  multivariate  model  as  a 
continuous  variable  (SUBSIDY).  This  allowed  for  an  assessment  of 
the  effect  of  the  magnitude  of  the  subsidy  received  on  default 
14  The  Loan-to-Value  measure  included  in  the  analysis  was 
adjusted  to  reflect  the  recapture  provision  in  the  Section  502 
program  and  transaction  costs  associated  with  foreclosure  and 
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and  graduation. 
In  order  to  determine  whether  the  program  was  implemented 
correctly,  two  variables  were  created.  The  first  measured  the 
difference  between  the  unsubsidized  mortgage  note  payment  and  the 
one  charged  in  the  program  (NOTEPAYDIF).  For  this,  the  current 
federal  fund  rate  and  the  size  of  the  loan  were  used  to  generate 
a  standard  monthly  payment.  The  generated  quantity  was 
subtracted  from  the  actual  quantity  charged  to  the  participant  to 
create  NOTEPAYDIF. 
The  difference  between  an  individual's  actual  monthly 
payment  and  what  the  payment  should  have  been  had  the  program 
been  correctly  implemented  (PAYDIF)  was  also  generated.  For  this 
variable,  the  most  current  information  on  adjusted  income  was 
used  (the  same  information  available  to  Farmer's  Home)  and  the 
rules  as  stated  in the  Homeownership  Assistance  Program  were 
applied.  From  this  variable,  another  variable  was  created  which 
accumulated  the  difference  in payment  over  the  life  of  the 
mortgage  (ACCPAYDIF). 
Finally,  a number  of  control  variables  suggested  by  prior 
work  were  also  included  in  the  analysis.  Borrower  related 
factors  included  in  the  analysis  were  the  gender,  race,  and 
changes  in  household  composition,  change  in  the  number  of 
dependents,  and  the  ratio  of  transfer  income  (AFDC,  SSI, 
disability,  pension,  and  child  support)  to  total  adjusted 
household  income. 20 
3.  Proportional  hazard  model 
The  questions  addressed  here  relate  to  discrete  transitions 
made  by  participants.  One  transition  is  default  on  the  mortgage. 
In particular,  we  are  interested  in  determining  which  factors 
exert  strong  effects  on  the  likelihood  of  default.  For  the 
purposes  of  this  study,  how  program  implementation  relates  to  the 
likelihood  of  default  is  the  major  focus. 
The  second  transition  is  from  the  subsidized  to  the 
unsubsidized  state.  While  we  are  interested  in  determining  which 
factors  contribute  to  the  probability  of  "graduation",  our  focus 
is  on  the  relation  between  program  implementation  and  the 
likelihood  of  achieving  independence. 
To  assess  the  effect  of  contemporaneous  program 
implementation,  property,  loan,  and  borrower  related  factors  on 
default,  a multivariate  analysis  is  required.  It  is  assumed  that 
graduation  from  the  program  is  related  to  mortgage  performance. 
For  this  reason,  it  is  assumed  that  same  factors  which  determine 
default  probability  will  influence  the  probability  of  graduation. 
Consistent  with  most  recent  default  studies,  a proportional 
hazard  methodology  was  used  in  the  analysis." 
Two  factors  dictate  both  the  choice  of  proportional  hazards 
specification  and  the  particular  specification  chosen.  First,  a 
process  is  being  modeled  rather  than  an  event  that  has  run  its 
I5  Green  and  Shoven  (1986),  Quigley  (1987),  Van  Order 
(1990),  Quigley  and  Van  Order  (1991).  See  Quercia  and  Stegman 
(1992)  for  a discussion  of  proportional  hazard  models  in  the 
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course.  The  data  gives  information  for  individuals  at  different 
points  of  time  during  the  life  of  a mortgage.  For  most  of  the 
observations  the  mortgage  is  "alive"  during  the  entire  period  of 
study.  The  proportional  hazards  specification  is  an  effective 
way  to  fully  utilize  information  for  all  participants.  Second, 
the  data  is  longitudinal.  This  allows  us  to  juxtapose 
contemporaneous  information  with  the  states  of  participants.  For 
this  purpose,  a model  with  time-varying  covariates  is 
estimated.16 
The  sample  can  be  divided  into  two  groups  according  to  the 
type  of  information  that  is  yielded.  The  first  group  is  defined 
as  those  for  whom  default  (or subsidy  termination)  has  occurred. 
The  information  yielded  by  this  group  is months  duration  of  the 
mortgage  and  all  exogenous  factors  which  describe  the  individual 
before  and  at  the  time  of  default  (subsidy  termination). 
The  second  group  is  composed  of  censored  observations. 
Censoring  can  occur  in  two  ways,  either  by  reaching  the  end  of 
the  study  period  with  the  mortgage  (subsidy)  "alive"  or  by 
terminating  the  mortgage  (subsidy)  through  sale  or  refinance. 
For  both  those  who  sell  or  refinance  and  those  who  leave  the 
16  This  should  be  distinguished  from  the  standard 
proportional  hazards  model  which  estimates  the  hazard  rate  base< 
on  the  value  of  a covariate  which  is  assumed  to  remain  constant 
over  time.  It  should  also  be  distinguished  from  models  with 
time-dependent  covariates.  In these  models,  covariates  are 
assumed  to  vary  over  the  relevant  period  as  a  function  of  time. 
The  time-varying  covariate  model  allows  for  discrete  changes  in 
the  value  of  covariates  which  are  assumed  to  remain  constant 
within  specific  periods  of  time  within  the  larger  duration 
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study  "alive",  the  information  yielded  is  the  number  of  months 
survived  and  the  vector  of  covariates  which  supported  that 
duration  of  survival  (subsidization).  We  cannot  assume  that 
censoring  indicates  that  default  will  never  occur,  we  only  know 
that  up  to  the  point  of  exit  from  the  sample,  it  had  not  yet 
occurred. 
While  we  are  interested  in  whether  an  individual  defaults 
(graduates),  the  "time  to  default"  or  the  "time  to  'graduation'" 
is  the  focus  of  analysis.  Although  a probit  or  logit  model 
estimating  the  probability  of  default  might  seem  to  be  the  more 
appropriate  and  intuitive  model,  such  a model  would  be  a 
misspecification.  There  is,  however,  a direct  correspondence 
between  the  time  to  default  and  whether  one  defaults.  The 
proportional  hazards  model  employed  estimates  how  particular 
covariates  affect  the  probability  of  defaulting  within  a given 
period  of  time  (here,  measured  in months)  relative  to  the 
probability  of  defaulting  at  some  unknown  time  in  the  future.  An 
important  thing  to  consider  is  that  an  individual  leaving  the 
sample  without  defaulting  or  reaching  independence  is  not 
necessarily  a non-defaulter  or  permanently  dependent  on  the 
program,  respectively.17 
17  To  accurately  assess  the  probability  of  default  using  a 
multinomial  probit  or  logit  specification  it  would  be  necessary 
to  follow  all  mortgages  to  their  completion.  One  could  model  the 
different  exit  states,  i.e.  amortization  of  mortgage,  resale, 
default,  and  assign  a probability  to  each.  Since  we  are  looking 
at  something  in process  rather  than  after  completion,  we  can  only 
make  inference  about  the  probability  of  default. 
It  would  be  a misspecification  to  use  probit  for  the  task 23 
The  Cox  proportional  hazards  model  used  is  based  on  the 
hazard  rate  function.  This  function  depicts  the  risk  of  an  event 
occurring  at  any  instant.  In the  models  estimated,  the  event  is 
either  mortgage  default  or  graduation  from  the  program. 
h(tl=Prob(mortgage-failure-during-interval-  (t,t+At)) 
(At)  Prob(mortgage-failure-after-time-t) 
h  (  t)  +,,  (  t)  eP1xl+P2x2+~.  *+pkxk 
The  function  h,(t)  is  called  the  baseline  hazard  function. 
This  can  have  any  shape.  The  proportional  hazards  specification 
compares  the  probability  of  default  within  an  interval  to  the 
probability  of  default  outside  the  interval.  Since  both 
probabilities  depend  on  the  baseline  rate,  it  cancels  out  in  the 
numerator  and  denominator. 
While  this  specification  a  implies  a continuous-time  hazard 
rate,  the  particular  functional  form  estimated  is  in  discrete- 
time.  For  this,  the  it  is  assumed  that  the  hazard  rate  is 
constant  within  discrete  time  intervals.  The  hazard  rate  can 
vary  in  discrete  jumps  from  interval  to  interval  given  changes  ir 
because  we  are  looking  at  default  within  a window  of  six  years. 
Treating  those  who  didn't  default  within  the  window  as 
non-defaulters  is  clearly  wrong.  Further,  not  all  mortgages 
originate  at  the  same  point  within  the  interval.  More  weight  is 
given  to  those  who  are  in  the  sample  for  a  shorter  time  if 
duration  isn't  taken  into  account. 24 
the  values  of  covariates.  The  unit  of  time  measurement  is  months 
with  discrete  jumps  taken  at  yearly  intervals  as  the  payment 
schedule  is  recalculated. 
The  coefficients  (betas)  are  estimated  in  the  regression. 
The  relative  risk  or  hazard  ratio  of  a  change  in  a  covariate  is: 
ePlxl+.  ”  p,(x,+Ax,)  +.  .  .Pgk 
ePlxl+.  . .pjxj+.  *  .Pkxk 
= e  PY% 
Typically,  hazard  ratios  are  reported  for  a  one  unit  change  in 
the  covariate.  This  can  be  interpreted  as  meaning:  a  one  unit 
increase  in  the  covariate  for  a  specific  interval  will  increase 
the  relative  risk  of  an  event  by  this  ratio: 
epi 
The  results  of  the  analysis  are  reported  in  Tables  A-E  in 
Appendix  2.  For  the  covariates  in  each  model  the  hazard  ratio 
is  reported.  A  hazard  ratio  greater  than  (less  than)  one 
indicates  an  increased  (decreased)  probability  of  default  given 
an  increase  in  the  covariate.  The  t-ratio  is  interpreted  in  the 
standard  fashion  using  the  prob-val  included.  The  sign  of  the  t- 
ratio  also  indicates  the  direction  of  the  effect. 
Results  of  Empirical  Analysis 
Descriptive  statistics  are  reported  in  Tables  1 and  2  in 25 
Appendix  1.  Of  874  observations  included  in  the  sample,  81 
defaulted  by  the  definition  above.  The  means  reported  in  Table 
la  reveal  that  the  average  borrower  was  almost  32  years  of  age 
with  just  over  10  years  of  education.  Thirty-three  percent  of 
the  households  were  headed  by  single  females.  Fifty-nine  percent 
of  the  households  were  two-parent  "family  units."  Twelve  percent 
of  the  families  were  characterized  as African  American,  ten 
percent  Hispanic.  Thirty-five  percent  of  the  borrowers  had  new 
houses  built  for  them  or  participated  in  the  self-help 
partnership  program.  The  average  mortgage  survived  63.69  months 
in  the  sample.'8  The  average  loan  was  $37,305.  The  average 
total  subsidy  paid  by  Farmer's  Home  was  $7,942.  Downpayments 
averaged  $596. 
Comparing  defaulters  to  non-defaulters  across  the  non-time- 
varying  means,  a  few  observations  can  be  made.  First,  there 
appears  to  be  a marked  difference  in  the  average  age  of 
defaulters  compared  to  non-defaulters,  27.42  years  compared  with 
32.30,  respectively.  Education  level  does  not  differ  very  much 
across  default  groups.  Fewer  than  average  family  units,  African- 
American  and  Hispanic  households  defaulted.  A  greater  proportion 
of  female-headed  households  seem  to  default.  Those  that  built 
new  homes  had  a  smaller  proportion  of  defaulters  than  others. 
The  loan  size  of  defaulters  was  slightly  lower  than  average, 
I8  Of  course,  a  large  number  of  the  mortgages  are  considered 
censored.  Given  that  the  observation  window  is  six  years  in 
duration,  this  mean  indicates  that  most  mortgages  left  the  sample 
still  "alive." 26 
while  the  subsidy  size  was  much  smaller.  Down  payment  was  higher 
for  defaulters  than  for  non-defaulters. 
The  discrepancy  measures  reported  in  Table  2  show  that  from 
the  beginning  payments  were  calculated  incorrectly.  From  year  to 
year,  the  average  miscalculation  varies  from  57.81  dollars  per 
year  in  1982  to  375.74  dollars  per  year  for  1986.  The 
accumulated  difference  in payments  reveals  increasing 
discrepancy.  While  the  mean  discrepancies  from  year  to  year  are 
positive  for  both  defaulters  and  non-defaulters  (indicating  a 
general  habit  of  overcharging  the  borrower),  the  means  are  higher 
for  every  year  for  defaulters. 
In  general,  errors  in monthly  payments  were  the  result  of 
the  payment  not  being  recalculated  given  a change  in  income.  The 
general  rise  in  the  value  of  the  discrepancy  indicates  that  as 
the  duration  of  mortgages  increased,  recalculations  were  less 
likely  to  be  made.  This  would  have  to  be  considered  an  error  of 
omission.  The  data  included  identifiers  for  region,  state,  and 
office.  There  was  no  pattern  for  inaccuracy  exhibited  across  any 
of  these  strata. 
Since  the  mortgages  are  fixed-rate,  the  value  of  the  note 
payment  remains  the  same  through  the  mortgage.  The  mean  note 
payment  discrepancy  is  small  and  negative  for  non-defaulters  and 
positive  for  defaulters.  As  indicated,  about  one  percent  of  the 
sample  had  the  terms  of  their  mortgage  calculated  incorrectly. 
This  would  have  to  be  considered  an  error  of  commission. 
How  the  delivery  of  mortgage  services  affected  mortgage 27 
performance  is  evaluated  in  the  models  presented  in  Tables  A- 
E.lg  Baseline  models  of  mortgage  default  are  presented  which 
employ  variables  suggested  by  the  literature  on  mortgage  default. 
The  program  delivery  variables  are  then  separately  added  to  the 
specification.  For  all  the  models,  the  duration  of  the  mortgage 
until  default  is  the  dependent  variable. 
The  simplest  specification  has  mortgage  default  depending 
four  variables:  payment-to-income  ratio  (PTIRATIO),  loan-to- 
value-ratio  (LVRATIO),  the  total  subsidy  paid  by  Farmer's  Home 
(SUBSIDY),  and  the  proportion  of  adjusted  income  accounted  for 
transfer  payments  (TRANSFER).  In this  model,  the  relation 
on 
by 
between  the  probability  of  default  and  PTIRATIO  is  positive  and 
statistically  significant.  Default  probability  has  a negative 
and  statistically  significant  relationship  with  SUBSIDY  and 
TRANSFER.  LVRATIO  does  not  show  a statistically  significant 
effect  on  the  probability  of  default."' 
Each  of  the  program  implementation  variables  shows  a 
statistically  significant  and  positive  effect  on  the  probability 
of  default.  Models  lb-ld  show  that  the  quality  of  program 
delivery  not  only  impacts  the  probability  of  default,  but  it 
tends  to  diminish  the  effect  of  other  variables.  In particular, 
I9  These  models  build  on  models  presented  in  Stegman, 
Quercia  and  McCarthy  (1993) 
"  This  is  consistent  with  the  claim  made  by  Stegman, 
Quercia,  and  McCarthy  (1993)  that  the  default  option  is  not 
exercised  ruthlessly  by  borrowers  in  the  program. 28 
when  PAYDIF  or  ACCPAYDIF  are  added  to  the  model  the  significance 
of  PTIRATIO  and  TRANSFER  fall  below  the  .05  significance 
threshold.  Including  NOTEPAYDIF  drives  the  significance  level  of 
TRANSFER  below  the  cutoff  level. 
A  second  specification,  building  on  Model  1,  is  shown  in 
Table  B.  It  includes  the  size  of  loan  at  origination  (LOAN),  a 
dummy  variable  denoting  those  who  built  new  homes  (BUILD)  either 
through  participation  in  the  self-help  program  or  through 
contracted  construction,  a dummy  variable  identifying  those  who 
went  through  a marital  disruption  in  the  previous  year 
(MAR-CHANGE)",  and  a dummy  variable  identifying  those  for  whom 
the  number  of  children  in  the  household  decreased  (LESSKID). 
In  the  baseline  model,  LOAN  and  LESSKID  show  a positive  and 
statistically  significant  effect  on  the  probability  of 
default."  Those  who  built  a new  home  had  a statistically 
significant,  lower  probability  of  default.  The  other  variables 
show  results  similar  to  Model  1, except  that  PTIRATIO  is  no 
longer  statistically  significant. 
When  added  to  this  model,  the  yearly  payment  variables  bear 
a  statistically  significant,  positive  effect  on  the  probability 
of  default.  NOTEPAYDIF  is  no  longer  statistically  significant. 
*'  A  marital  disruption  is  def 
or  the  death  of  a  spouse. 
'ined as:  divorce,  separation, 
"  The  measured  effect  of  loan  size  is  consistent  with  the 
HAC  (1988,  p.1)  finding  that  "poverty-level  households  were  less 
likely  than  others  to  be  delinquent,  and  more  likely  to  be  ahead 
in payments,"  given  that  loan  size  is  contingent  on  ability  to 
pay  (income). 29 
Incorporating  PAYDIF  in  the  specification  had  large  effects  on 
the  other  variables  in  the  model.  In particular,  the  effects  of 
TRANSFER  and  LOAN  disappeared  while  MAR-CHANGE  became 
statistically  significant. 
Table  C presents  the  results  of  a  "demographic"  model.  This 
includes  the  standard  variables  from  Model  1 with  variables 
depicting  demographic  characteristics  of  the  borrowers.  These 
are:  a dummy  variable  indicating  an African-American  borrower 
(AF_AMER);  a dummy  variable  designating  female-headed 
households;  a dummy  variable  designating  two-parent  households 
(FAMUNIT).  The  model  shows  that  African-American  households  and 
"family  units"  have  a  statistically  significant  lower  probability 
of  default.  Female-headed  households  show  a negative  but  not 
statistically  significant  effect. 
All  of  the  variables  depicting  quality  of  implementation 
show  a  statistically  significant,  positive  effect  when  added  to 
this  model.  PAYDIF  diminishes  the  measured  effect  of  PTIRATIO, 
TRANSFER,  and  AF_AMER.  ACCPAYDIF  and  NOTEPAYDIF  exert  less 
influence  on  the  coefficients  of  other  variables. 
The  duration  until  graduation  from  the  program  is  presented 
in  Tables  D  and  E.  Again,  simple  specifications  are  presented 
and  the  program  delivery  variables  are  then  included.  In Model 
4,  PTIRATIO  has  a positive  and  statistically  significant  effect 
on  the  probability  of  graduating  from  the  program.  TRANSFER  and 
SUBSIDY  exert  a negative  and  statistically  significant  effect  on 
the  probability  of  graduation.  In Model  5,  LOAN  and  LESSKID  have 30 
a positive  and  statistically  significant  effect  while  BUILD, 
TRANSFER,  and  SUBSIDY  show  statistically  significant  negative 
effects.  LVRATIO  and  MAR  CHANGE  do  not  show  significance  in  - 
either  model. 
As  in  the  default  models,  PAYDIF  and  NOTEPAYDIF  show  a 
statistically  significant,  positive  effect  on  the  probability  of 
graduation  from  the  program.  NOTEPAYDIF  does  not,  however,  show 
significance  in  either  model. 
Discussion  and  Implications 
The  empirical  evidence 
delivery  has  a  large  impact 
participants  in  the  section 
indicates  that  the  quality  of  program 
on  mortgage  performance  for 
502  program.  As  monthly  payments 
rise  above  those  mandated  by  the  program,  both  the  probability  of 
default  and  the  probability  of  "graduation"  from  the  program 
increases.  In  terms  of  the  evaluation  of  program  performance, 
errors  in  payment  calculation  will  increase  the  number  of  those 
who  default.  Oddly,  these  errors  will  also  work  to  give  the 
appearance  that  the  program  is performing  better  in  terms  of 
moving  borrowers  to  the  unsubsidized  state.  HAC  notes  that 
"recent  emphasis  on  increasing  'graduations'  out  of  the  program 
have  produced  some  stress  and  anxiety  among  borrowers."23  There 
is  clearly  incentive  incompatibility  built  into  the  program  if 
graduation  is  stressed  as  a goal. 
23  HAC  (1988)  p.  23 31 
If part  of  the  financial  strain  of  maintaining  a mortgage  is 
exerted  through  program  implementation,  why  wouldn't  relief  have 
been  sought  through  payment  recalculation  at  the  request  of  the 
borrower?  One  key  might  be  the  complicated  written  regulations 
of  the  program.  Those  who  participated  in  the  program  had  to 
wade  through  numerous  forms  and  an  one-hundred-plus  page  document 
full  of  complicated  calculations  and  legalese.24  The 
implication  here  is  that  the  borrowers  were  not  familiar  with  the 
terms  of  the  program. 
Further,  the  program  was  administered 
Personal  intervention  took  place  at  the  in 
at  multiple  levels. 
itiative  of  the  loca  1 
Farmer's  Home  offices  while  bookkeeping  was  done  at  the  regional 
level  and  at  the  central  Finance  Office  in  St.  Louis.  HAC  notes 
that  "there  were  many  examples  of  statements  from  the  Finance 
Office  which  had  been  corrected  by  the  County  Office.  However, 
in  the  absence  of  such  assistance,  the  borrower  bears  the  burden 
of  proof."2" 
Faulty  underwriting  plays  a  statistically  significant  role 
in mortgage  default  while  it  does  not  have  much  impact  on 
graduation.  It  is  unlikely  that  many  of  the  participants  had 
enough  knowledge  of  mortgage  underwriting  to  be  able  to  check 
whether  calculations  had  been  performed  correctly.  It  is  also 
24  Merely  creating  the  computer  algorithm  to  calculate 
repayment  in  the  event  of  default  or  resale  was  a vexing  problem 
that  required  three  days. 
25  ibid  p.  23 32 
possible  that  those  in  Farmer's  Home  Offices  responsible  for 
delivering  the  program  were  not  entirely  familiar  with  mortgage 
underwriting.  A  one-percent  error  rate  is  not  exceptionally 
high.26  For  program  evaluation,  faulty  underwriting  will 
increase  the  number  of  defaults  without  much  effect  on  the 
graduation  aspect  of  the  program. 
Form  FmHA  1944-6  titled  "Interest  Credit  Agreement"  is  one 
of  many  pieces  of  paperwork  required  to  gain  financing  under 
Section  502.  It  details  the  methods  by  which  subsidies  and 
payments  are  calculated.  In the  stipulations  of  the  contract 
listed  on  the  back  of  the  form  it  states:  "The  Government  may 
amend  or  cancel  the  agreement  and  collect  any  amount  of  reduction 
granted  which  resulted  from  incomplete  or  inaccurate  information, 
an  error  in  computation,  or  any  other  reason  which  resulted  in 
interest  credit  that  the  borrower  was  not  entitled  to 
receive."27  This  implies  that  some  form  of  oversight  might  have 
been  planned.  Since  the  extent  of  the  data  used  for  this  study 
is  limited  to  a  six  year  window,  it  is  entirely  possible  that 
some  oversight  took  place  outside  the  sample  period.  Regardless 
of  whether  it  did,  this  study  argues  for  some  form  of  oversight. 
Section  502  of  the  Farmer's  Home  Administration  is  a well- 
26  I remember  a  study  done  a  few  years  back  checking  how 
mortgage  lenders  adjusted  payments  on ARMS.  The  results  were 
striking...  a huge  number  of  mortgages  were  miscalculated  and  the 
errors  were  not  typically  in  the  banks'  favor.  I will,  of 
course,  track  down  the  citation  for  this  study. 
"  HAC  (1987)  Appendix  5, p.  43  (italics  added  for  emphasis) 33 
conceived  program.  Even  with  the  delivery  problems  analyzed 
here,  the  default  rate  was  less  than  ten  percent.  Given  that  the 
participants  are  the  poor  and  very  poor,  this  is  an  impressive 
rate.  Housing  assistance  for  the  rural  poor  is  an  important 
component  of  a national  housing  policy.  That  program 
implementation  exerted  negative  effects  on  the  performance  of  the 
program  is  troubling.  The  real  question  is  whether  FmHA  is  the 
best  agency  to  provide  delivery  for  the  program.  A  comprehensive 
national  housing  policy  might  best  be  implemented  by  a  single 
agency  devoted  to  housing  alone. 
When  Section  502  is  a minor  portion  of  the  activity  of  a 
FmHA  office,  it  is  unlikely  that  individual  agents  will  have  the 
time  or  desire  to  gain  a  full  understanding  of  the  program.  This 
study  certainly  argues  for  simpler-to-implement  policy. 
Understanding  the  subtleties  of  Section  502  was  a daunting  task 
for  our  analysis.  It  is  understandable  that  errors  were  made  in 
its  delivery  by  FmHA.  Further,  the  size  of  the  transactions  are 
small  enough  and  the  administrative  costs  high  enough  to  push  the 
program  down  the  priority  list  in  favor  of  larger  agricultural 
programs.  HAC  notes  that  limited  manpower  in  County  Offices  made 
intervention  with  "high  risk"  borrowers  difficult  and  argues  for 
increasing  staff  in  the  local  offices:  "The  typical  office 
visited  serviced  a  caseload  of  hundreds  of  mortgagors  (both  home 
and  farm)  with  a total  staff  of  four  people."28 
'a  HAC  (1988)  p.  22,  30 34 
The  major  policy  recommendation  coming  from  this  study  is 
for  better  program  delivery.  This  could  be  accomplished  in  a 
number  of  ways.  First,  a  simpler  process  minimizing 
administrative  and  individual  confusion  should  be  adopted. 
Second,  better  staffing  of  local  offices  would  increase  the 
ability  of  offices  to  adequately  address  their  caseloads.  Third, 
oversight  should  be  done  on  a regular  basis  to  protect  the 
interests  of  both  the  government  and  program  participants.  A 
final  option  might  be  to  move  the  responsibility  of  rural 
homeownership  assistance  under  the  aegis  of  a  single  national 
housing  authority. 35 
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APPENDIX  1. 
Table  la  (Means,  non-time-varying  variables) 
Variable  Mean  Mean  Mean 
(all)  (non-default)  (default) 
n=874  n=793  n=81 
Age  31.93  32.39  27.42 
Education  10.29  10.31  10.10 
Female  HH  0.332  0.330  0.346 
Family  Unit  0.592  0.599  0.519 
Black  HH  0.121  0.127  0.062 
Hispanic  HH  0.104  0.106  0.086 
Build  0.349  0.363  0.209 
Months  63.69  65.39  47.05 
Loan  37305  37327  37099 
Tot.  Subsidy  7942  10817  4470 
Down  Pavment  596  530  1245 
Table  lb  (Means,  time-varying  variables) 
Variable  Yr  Mean  Mean  Mean 
(all)  (non-default)  (default) 
n=874  n=793  n=81 
ADJINC  81  9302  9373  8614 
82  9752  9812  9165 
83  11060  11086  10810 
84  12139  12163  11912 
85  13141  13181  12744 
86  13927  13985  13367 
PTIEWTIO  81  .243  .242  .255 
82  .241  .239  .263 
83  .267  .262  322 
84  .294  .286  :378 
85  .311  295  466 
86  .340  :320  :539 
TRANSFER  81  .132  .139  069 
82  .127  . 134  :056 
83  .149  . 156  .074 
84  .152  .158  -092 
85  .127  . 135  .054 
86  .120  . 131  . 013 
LTVRATIO  81  963 





83  1.154  1.142  1.284 
84  1.302  1.305  1.263 
85  1.357  1.359  1.329 
86  1.300  1.309  1.021 38 
Table  2  (Discrepancy  Measures) 
Variable  n  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
NOTEPAYDIF  874  0.0977  27.10  -331  486 
PAYDIF81  758  145.20  580.52  -761  4654 
PAYDIF82  869  57.81  381.73  -2223  4365 
PAYDIF83  869  69.71  419.25  -1426  4007 
PAYDIF84  864  134.65  570.28  -2435  4447 
PAYDIF85  840  214.07  728.70  -4440  4750 
PAYDIF86  781  375.74  1101.92  -3864  4840 
ACCPAYDIF81  758  145.20  580.52  -761  4645 
ACCPAYDIF82  869  184.47  738.52  -2223  7062 
ACCPAYDIF83  869  244.26  927.49  -2508  10083 
ACCPAYDIF84  864  369.97  1181.95  -2503  10299 
ACCPAYDIF85  840  547.88  1542.21  -4610  11715 
ACCPAYDIF86  781  808.83  1935.42  -4610  14048 
Table  2b  (Discrepancy  Measures  - defaulters) 
Variable  n  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
NOTEPAYDIF  81  6.12  62.31  -188  486 
PAYDIF81  68  219.28  651.23  -308  3672 
PAYDIF82  81  211.75  753.81  -1222  4365 
PAYDIF83  78  220.61  713.68  -443  4007 
PAYDIF84  73  430.74  987.56  -2396  3456 
PAYDIF85  55  874.99  1286.70  -1264  4750 
PAYDIF86  24  1459.2  1521.30  -1233  4254 
ACCPAYDIF81  68  219.28  651.23  -308  3672 
ACCPAYDIF82  81  395.83  1039.78  -1242  4807 
ACCPAYDIF83  78  521.15  1347.89  -1094  7355 
ACCPAYDIF84  73  865.49  1690.33  -2071  9854 
ACCPAYDIF85  55  1479.1  2039.98  -1270  6862 
ACCPAYDIF86  24  1968.7  2146.46  -2503  6225 
Table  2c  (Discrepancy  Measures  - non-defaulters) 
Variable  n  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
NOTEPAYDIF  793  -0.52  20.32  -331  235 
PAYDIF81  690  137.90  573.08  -761  4645 
PAYDIF82  788  41.99  316.65  -2222  3546 
PAYDIF83  791  54.83  375.51  -1426  3738 
PAYDIF84  791  107.32  507.47  -2435  4447 
PAYDIF85  785  167.76  649.17  -4440  4447 
PAYDIF86  757  341.40  973.47  -3864  4840 
ACCPAYDIF81  690  137.90  573.08  -761  4645 
ACCPAYDIF82  788  162.75  697.55  -2222  7062 
ACCPAYDIF83  791  216.96  871.66  -2508  10083 
ACCPAYDIF84  791  324.24  1113.97  -2503  10299 
ACCPAYDIF85  785  482.64  1481.06  -4610  11714 
ACCPAYDIF86  757  772.06  1918.47  -4610  14047 39 
APPENDIX  2 
Table  A  (Model  1) 
Dependent  Variable:  Duration  of  mortgage 
Covariate  Model  1  Model  lb  Model  lc  Model  Id 
PTIRATIO  1.1934  1.1579  1.1769  1.1952 
(2.27)**  (1.25)  (1.88)  (2.30)** 
LVRATIO  1.0046  1.0052  1.0074  1.0052 
(0.24)  (0.25)  (0.45)  (0.31) 
TRANSFER  0.0765  0.1280  0.0859  0.0788 
(-1.99)**  (-1.68)  (-1.94)  (-1.98)** 
SUBSIDY  0.9998  0.9999  0.9999  0.9998 
(-3.18)**  (-3.131**  (-2.06)**  (-2.18)** 
PAYDIF  1.0007 
(8.34)** 
ACCPAYDIF  1.0002 
(4.97)** 
NOTEPAYDIF  1.0068 
(2.88)** 
l * denotes  statistical  significance  at  the  -05  level 
t-ratios  appear  below  reported  hazard  ratios 40 
Table  B  (Model  2) 
Dependent  Variable:  Duration  of  mortgage 
Covariate  Model  2  Model  2b  Model  2c  Model  2d 
PTIRATIO  1.1609  1.1398  1.1578  1.1647 
(1.84)  (1.12)  (1.63)  (1.88) 
LVRATIO  1.0100  1.1026  1.0127  1.0099 
(0.59)  (0.66)  (0.76)  (0.59) 
TRANSFER  0.0804  0.1264  0.0844  0.0809 
(-1.98)**  (-1.69)  (-1.97y*  (-1.98)** 
SUBSIDY  0.9998  0.9998  0.9998  0.9998 
(-5.58)**  (-3.57)**  (-2.55)**  (-5.21)** 
LOAN  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
(2.91)**  (0.983)  (1.06)  (2.55)** 
BUILD  0.2428  0.2575  0.2462  0.2574 
(-3.65)**  (-3.48)**  (-3.61)**  (-3.47)** 
MAR  CHANGE  2.6194  3.6699  2.8850  2.6518 
(1.59)  (2.16)**  (1.76)  (1.61) 
LESSKID  3.6088  2.0908  3.3813  3.6095 
(3.89)**  (2.08)**  (3.67)**  (3.90)** 
PAYDIF  1.0007 
(6.59)** 
ACCPAYDIF  1.0002 
(3.86)** 
NOTEPAYDIF  1.0037 
(1.254) 
**  denotes  statistical  significance  at  the  .05  level 
t-ratios  appear  below  reported  hazard  ratios 41 
Table  C  (Model  3) 
Dependent  Variable:  Duration  of  mortgage 
Covariate  Model  3  Model  3b  Model  3c  Model  3d 
PTIRATIO  1.1712  1.1319  1.1703  1.1729 
(1.95)  (1.02)  (1.70)  (1.98)** 
LVRATIO  1.0047  1.0062  1.0077  1.0049 
(0.29)  (0.30)  (0.48)  (0.31) 
TRANSFER  0.0522  0.0952  0.0665  0.0534 
(-2.16)**  (-1.81)  (-  (-2.14)** 
2.07)** 
MAR  CHANGE  2.8272  3.7217  3.6193  2.8784  - 
(1.73)  (2.18)**  (2.08)**  (1.76) 
LESSKID  3.5402  1.7255  3.0117  3.4377 
(3.88)**  (1.53)  (3.39)**  (3.78)** 
AF  AMER  0.2089  0.3245  0.2288  0.2158  - 
(-2.17)**  (-1.55)  (-  (-2.12)** 
2.04)** 
FEMALE  0.4645  0.5214  0.6393  0.5121 
(-1.86)  (-1.59)  (-1.06)  (-1.58) 
FAMUNIT  0.3546  0.4353  0.4653  0.3913 
(-2.70)**  (-  (-1.94)  (-2.36)** 
2.16)** 
PAYDIF  1.0007 
(7.5,16)* 
ACCPAYDIF  1.0027 
(6.49)** 
NOTEPAYDIF  1.0046 
(2.17)** 
'*  denotes  statistical  significance  at  the  .05  level 
t-ratios  appear  below  reported  hazard  ratios 42 
Table  D  (Model  4) 
Dependent  Variable:  Duration  until  "graduation" 
Covariate  Model  4  Model  4b  Model  4c  Model  4d 
PTIRATIO  1.2245  0.7517  1.2050  1.2246 
(4.35)**  (-0.57)  (3.64)**  (4.35)** 
LVRATIO  1.0115  1.0156  1.0136  1.0116 
(1.65)  (1.84)  (1.97)**  (1.66) 
TRANSFER  0.1917  0.5199  0.2171  0.1928 
(-3.83)**  (-1.60)  (-3.57)**  (-3.81)** 
SUBSIDY  0.9998  0.9998  0.9999  0.9998 
(-10.6)**  (-11.7)**  (-5.73)**  (-10.5)** 
PAYDIF  1.0011 
(16.2)** 
ACCPAYDIF  1.0002 
(9.24)** 
NOTEPAYDIF  1.0018 
(0.79) 
l * denotes  statistical  significance  at  the  .05  level 
t-ratios  appear  below  reported  hazard  ratios 43 
Table  E  (Model  5) 
Dependent  Variable:  Duration  until  "graduation" 
Covariate  Model  5  Model  5b  Model  5c  Model  5d 
PTIRATIO  1.1905  0.9255  1.1835  1.1882 
(3.47)**  (0.20)  (2.99)**  (3.42)** 
LVRATIO  1.0097  1.0173  1.0117  1.0098 
(1.40)  (2.12)**  (1.66)  (1.41) 
TRANSFER  0.2859  0.5744  0.2986  0.2872 
(-2.99y  (-1.37)  (-2.91)**  (-2.98)** 
SUBSIDY  0.9997  0.9998  0.9998  9997 
(-13.3)**  (-10.6)**  (--7.71)**  (-;3.3)** 
LOAN  1.0001  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
(6.88)**  (1.72)  (3.90)**  (6.88)** 
BUILD  0.5133  0.6312  0.5093  0.4965 
(-3.96)**  (-2.71)**  (-4.07j**  (-4.10)** 
MAR  CHANGE  0.3882  1.0683  0.4878  0.3788  - 
(-1.59)  (0.11)  (-1.22)  (1.62) 
LESSKID  5.2599  1.6182  5.1787  5.2087 
(ll.o)**  (2.63)**  (10.8)**  (10.9)** 
PAYDIF  1.0010 
t14.01** 
ACCPAYDIF  1.0002 
(6.25)** 
NOTEPAYDIF  0.9972 
(1.126) 
**  denotes  statistical  significance  at  the  .05  level 
t-ratios  appear  below  reported  hazard  ratios 